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THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF TRIBAL PAYDAY LENDING TO
TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Bree R. Black Horse*
INTRODUCTION
Tribal leaders are regularly confronted with the challenge of funding
their sovereign nations and providing for their people during this era of
economic volatility and stagnant growth. While some tribal nations
possess the substantial financial and natural resources necessary to
overcome the difficulties associated with achieving self-determination,
economic self-sufficiency, and self-governance, the reality is many tribal
nations do not. Tribes geographically isolated from urban areas and
lacking in natural resources often struggle to not only meet the needs of
their people, but also to operate sustainable sovereign nations that
provide all of the systems and resources present in modern governments.
For these tribes, online payday lending operations may provide a
temporary solution.
Opponents of tribal payday lending claim that non-Indian lenders
attempt to conduct business with Indian tribes under the guise of the
alleged “sovereignty model” in an effort to evade regulations and
prosecution. While these critics question the legality and transparency of
tribally affiliated payday lending operations, some tribal nations are
operating payday lending enterprises consistent with the policies and legal
framework of tribal sovereign immunity. Namely, the lending operations
executed by the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma serve as an example of a
tribally run business entitled to sovereign immunity.
This article begins with an exploration of the payday lending
industry and the payday loan itself, emphasizing the arguments for and
against allowing payday loans. Next, it will briefly discuss several state
and federal efforts to regulate the payday lending industry in order to
provide for an understanding of the regulatory entities that will likely
*
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challenge the right tribes possess to operate payday lending enterprises.
With the backdrop of the short-term, small-dollar credit market set, the
relationship between tribes and payday lending is introduced.
While organizations argue both sides of the payday lending debate
and regulators attempt to take action against the predatory practice, tribes
may yet have the opportunity to operate such businesses under the
sovereignty model. After a discussion concerning the basic principles of
sovereign immunity, the wide array of the arm of the tribe tests
implemented by the federal courts of appeals are examined in detail. At
the conclusion of the discussion, a universal arm of the tribe test, informed
by the trends in the federal courts, is presented and applied to an example
entity from a federally recognized tribe.
I. THE PRACTICE AND REGULATION OF THE PAYDAY LENDING INDUSTRY
A. An Examination of the Short-Term, Small-Dollar Credit
Market
1. What is a Payday Loan?
A payday loan is a small personal loan secured by direct access to
the borrower’s bank account, either through a post-dated check or other
authorization to withdraw funds from the account on the borrower’s next
payday. Obtaining a payday loan is relatively simple when compared to
the requirements of obtaining a traditional bank-issued loan. Payday
lenders often only require verification of an open bank account, a steady
source of income, and identification for approval whereas traditional
lenders commonly require satisfactory credit history and asset-based
collateral to obtain a loan. In general, payday loans range in size from
$100 to $1,000, and the average loan term is about two weeks. A payday
loan is typically referred to as short-term, small-dollar credit due to the
repayment period and the dollar amount of the loan.
Although borrowing is generally concentrated among younger, lowto-moderate-income individuals, research shows that people of most ages
and incomes utilize payday loans.1 More than twelve million Americans

1

THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY
LENDING IN AMERICA: PART ONE - W HO BORROWS, W HERE THEY BORROW, AND W HY 10
(2012), www.pewtrusts.org/small-loans (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
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use payday loans annually.2 Significantly, about three-quarters of
borrowers obtain a payday loan through a storefront operation, while
roughly one-quarter of borrowers acquire a payday loan online.3 With
millions of Americans routinely using this loan method, payday lending has
grown into a multi-billion dollar industry. Payday loan users spend
approximately $7.4 billion annually at over 36,000 storefront operations
and at hundreds of online websites.4
2. The Payday Loan Debate
While payday loans are advertised as short-term, small-dollar credit
intended for emergency or special use, a majority of borrowers5 use
payday loans to cover ordinary living expenses over the course of months
– not for unexpected emergencies over the course of weeks.6 In reality, a
borrower’s initial reasons for taking out a payday loan stem from an
ongoing need for income, rather than a short-term need to cover an
unexpected expense.7 A typical borrower uses payday loans multiple
times a year, and much of this borrowing comes in relatively quick
succession once the borrower begins using payday loans.8 To illustrate,
the average borrower takes out eight individual loans of $375 each per
year, and spends $520 on interest annually.9 As a result, the typical
borrower is indebted about five to seven months of the year.10
Industry advocates and regulators advise consumers that using
payday loans for recurring expenses is not an effective use of this highcost credit, and emphasize that payday loans should be used to cover
unexpected expenses for a short period of time.11 In reality, about twothirds of borrowers use a payday loan to cover a recurring monthly
2

Id.
Id. at 9.
4
Id.
5
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY
LENDING IN AMERICA: PART TWO HOW BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 9
(2013) (Four times more storefront borrowers used their first payday loan for a recurring
expense (69 percent) than an unexpected expense (16 percent)).
6
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY
LENDING IN AMERICA: W HO BORROWS, W HERE THEY BORROW, AND W HY 6 (2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_detail.aspx?id=327397 (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
7
Id at 10.
8
Id. at 13.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 13.
11
Id. at 11.
3
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expense,12 while only one-third of borrowers use a payday loan to deal
with an unexpected expense.13 The controversial lending practices
associated with payday loans, such as high interest rates and chronic
borrowing, have ignited a fierce debate between consumer advocates,
government officials, and representatives of the payday lending industry.
Opponents of payday lending claim that the practice is unethical in
nature, preying on overburdened low-income individuals. For instance, the
profitability of payday lenders is contingent on repeat borrowing, as a new
customer only becomes profitable for the lender after the fourth or fifth
loan.14 Consumer groups also contend that payday loans are expensive
debt, with interest rates often exceeding 400% APR.15 Furthermore,
opponents argue that a payday loan is usually impossible to repay by the
borrower’s next payday.16 Moreover, most borrowers renew or re-borrow
rather than repay their loans.17 As a result, opponents claim that
consumers are trapped in a cycle of debt subject to unfavorable and costly
repayment terms.
On the other hand, advocates of payday lending argue that the
model is a vital resource to under-banked18 individuals facing an urgent
need to solve temporary problems. In support of this argument,
proponents cite the simplicity of the application process, and nearly
immediate loan approval followed by a direct disbursement of cash funds.
To demonstrate, payday lenders offer instant loan approval or denial
decisions, and loan determinations are commonly based on the
verification of employment rather than credit history or asset collateral.
Advocates conclude that a payday loan is an easily attainable, unsecured

12

Id. (Examples of recurring monthly expense include rent or mortgage payments, food,
utilities, car payments, and credit card payments).
13
Id. at 14.
14
Id. at 15.
15
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0097-payday-loans (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
16
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY
LENDING IN AMERICA: PART TWO HOW BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 9
(2013) (The average borrower can afford to pay $50 per two weeks to a payday lender,
but only 14 percent can afford the more than $400 needed to pay off the full amount of
these non-amortizing loans).
17
Id. at 13-19.
18
THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE COMPANY (“Under-banked” consumers typically hold
a bank account, but also rely on alternative financial services such as non-bank check
cashing services, non-bank remittances, pawn shops, rent-to-own services, and payday
loans), http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
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debt designed to assist a financially challenged borrower in a timely
manner.
In an effort to combat the claims of opponents, the payday loan
industry trade group issued best practices, and a customer bill of rights.19
The payday lending industry’s stated best practices limit individual loan
rollovers and encourage lenders to offer extended repayment plans.20
Despite the promotion of these standards, marketing and lending practices
differ greatly. In light of the recent payday lending debate and inconsistent
business practices, most states have taken regulatory action intended to
curb predatory practices.
B. State Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry
Currently, payday lending is primarily regulated at the state level
through statutes designed to enable, control, or prohibit payday lending.
Legislative efforts typically mandate interest caps, limit the number of
loans a borrower can take on an annual basis, and implement more
consumer-friendly repayment terms. Most states have taken some
regulatory action in light of the recent controversy stemming from payday
lending practices, but these regulatory schemes range from permissive to
prohibitory.
A majority of states take a permissive regulatory approach to
payday lending, implementing either minimal guidelines or no regulations
at all. Twenty-eight states21 follow this permissive regulatory approach,
under which payday lenders can easily charge triple digit interest rates
and dictate stringent repayment terms.

19

The Community Financial Services of America member best practices,
http://cfsaa.com/cfsa-member-best-practices.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
20
Id.
21
Permissive states allow single-repayment loans with APRs exceeding 391%. These
states include Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming. http://www.pewstates.org/research/datavisualizations/state-payday-loan-regulation-and-usage-rates-85899405695 (last visited
Apr. 20, 2013).

392

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume I, Issue II – Spring 2013

In states that enact strong consumer protections, the result is a
large net decrease in payday loan usage.22 Moreover, borrowers residing
in these states are not driven to seek payday loans online or from other
sources in response to stringent regulations.23 While many states have
enacted legislation over the past decade intended to curb predatory
payday lending practices, federal regulators have only recently addressed
the controversial practices associated with the payday lending industry.
C. Federal Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry
Federal policy on payday lending is swiftly developing, with action
both at the congressional and executive levels. Beginning in 2007,
Congress enacted a law regulating payday lending practices involving
members of the armed services and their families.24 More recently, the
SAFE Lending Act was introduced in the 112th Congress.25 The Act would
require online lenders to abide by the regulations of the state in which the
borrower resides.26 Correspondingly, there was also a similar House Bill
introduced in the same session.27
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and the Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 established the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.28 The Bureau was created for the purpose, among other things, of
protecting consumers from abusive financial service practices.29
Accordingly, the Bureau has the authority to regulate payday loans.30
While the Bureau recently commenced its first field hearing to gather
information on the short-term, small-dollar credit market, it has not yet

22

THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY
LENDING IN AMERICA: W HO BORROWS, W HERE THEY BORROW, AND W HY 22-24 (2012),
www.pewtrusts.org/small-loans (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
23
Id.
24
10 U.S.C. § 987, 32 C.F.R. § 232.3 (The Talent-Nelson Amendment to the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act, limits the permissible annual percentage rate
and creates structural requirements for certain small dollar loans issued to members of
the armed services and their dependents).
25
th
SAFE Lending Act, S. 3426, 112 Cong. (2012).
26
Id.
27
th
SAFE Lending Act, H.R. 6483, 112 Cong. (2012).
28
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§53015641 (2010).
29
124 Stat. §1376.
30
12 U.S.C. § 5514.
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taken measurable regulatory or legal action against payday lenders.31
However, consumer advocates and federal officials anticipate that the
Bureau will play a significant role in the future. Despite the absence of
action from the Bureau, the Federal Trade Commission has recently taken
an active role in policing the payday lending industry.
The Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection,
while lacking jurisdiction over banks, can exercise authority over the
payday lending industry.32 With regard to payday lenders, the FTC
enforces the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Truth In Lending Act,
and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act.33 In 2011, the FTC brought action
against numerous payday lenders, including tribal entities, for various
deceptive practices in federal district court.34
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIAN TRIBES AND THE PAYDAY LENDING
INDUSTRY
Over the past two decades, the short-term, small-dollar credit
market landscape has changed dramatically. While the payday loan
industry mainly serves customers and generates revenue through
storefront operations, the early twenty-first century has witnessed a
migration of payday loan providers to the internet. 35 Consumer advocates
and some storefront lenders have cautioned that online payday lending
can exploit borrowers because these online loans often occur outside of
the reach of state regulators.36 Although some lenders purport to be statelicensed and to comply with state interest rate caps and loan terms,
numerous online lenders claim choice of law from states with no rate caps
31

Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Examines Payday
Lending (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-examines-payday-lending/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
32
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012).
33
Id.
34
See Federal Trade Commission v. AMG Services, Inc., et al. Case No. 2:12-cv-00536,
FTC File No. 112 3024 (2012); and Federal Trade Commission v. Payday Financial, et al.
Case No. 3:11-cv-03017-RAL, FTC File No. 112 3023 (2012).
35
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, A SHORT HISTORY OF PAY DAY LENDING LAW 1 (2012)
(citing GARY RIVLIN, BROKE USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC. – HOW THE WORKING
POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS 54 (2001)).
36
LAUREN K. SANDERS, ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, STOPPING THE PAYDAY
LOAN TRAP: ALTERNATIVES THAT W ORK, ONES THAT DON’T 4-6 (2010) (describing payday
loans and the harms they cause consumers),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/report-stoppingpayday-trap.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
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or from foreign countries.37 Notably, a growing number of online lenders
claim to be exempt from state law enforcement as a result of tribal
sovereign immunity. Controversy has developed with regards to online
payday lending operations that evade state regulations by affiliating with
Native American tribes.
Sovereign immunity generally precludes tribally run businesses
from state regulations.38 Some tribes have claimed immunity in state and
federal courts on behalf of the payday lending entities that consumer
groups accuse of charging usurious interest rates to mainly low-income
borrowers. Tribally affiliated payday lenders, due to this claim of immunity,
are able to operate internet-based payday lending businesses in states
where the interest rates charged by lenders exceed those permitted by the
state or in states where payday lending is banned all together. This
immunity is commonly referred to as the “sovereignty model.”
There are more than 560 federally recognized sovereign tribes in
the United States, many of which do not benefit from the gaming industry,
a proximity to urban centers, or abundant natural resources. For many
tribes, geography creates a number of barriers to promoting economic
growth. Proponents of tribal payday lending argue that these barriers to
economic growth create a need for tribal internet-based opportunities.39
Presently, there are at least eleven federally recognized Native
American tribes affiliated with payday lending.40 A majority of the
companies offering payday lending services claim ownership and
operation by tribes located in Oklahoma, but numerous tribes from
California to Wisconsin participate in the payday lending business.
The controversy surrounding tribally affiliated payday lending
operations is predominately centered on the tribal lenders’ immunity from
37

CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, CFA SURVEY OF ONLINE PAYDAY LOAN W EBSITES 56 (2011).
38
See infra note 54.
39
Native American Financial Services Association, http://www.mynafsa.org/usefulinformation/nafsa-fact-sheet/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (one of two trade organizations
for tribally-affiliated payday lenders).
40
Big Lagoon Rancheria Band of Yurok and Tolowa Indians; Big Valley Band of Pomo
Indians; Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of Nebraska; Chippewa Cree Tribe; Miami Tribe of
Oklahoma; Modoc Tribe of Oklahoma; Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians; Santee Sioux
Nation of Nebraska; Sokaogon Chippewa Community; Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana;
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians.
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state regulation and suit. Tribes are entitled to this immunity under the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Tribal businesses may also enjoy the
protections of sovereign immunity if they function as an “arm of the tribe.”
Critics of tribal payday lending and tribal officials disagree as to the legal
status of these operations. Under established Federal Indian Law, the only
manner in which to resolve the question of whether tribal payday lenders
are entitled to the protections of tribal sovereign immunity is to submit
tribal payday lending entities to an arm of the tribe analysis.
In order to determine whether tribal payday lending entities operate
as an arm of the tribe consistent with the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity, it is necessary to review the principles of tribal sovereign
immunity, and the corresponding arm of the tribe test. First, the history
and policies underlying the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity will be
examined. Next, the several arm of the tribe tests used by the federal
courts of appeals will be scrutinized. From this point, it is possible to
deduct a universal arm of the tribe test by which the immunity question
can be resolved. Consequently, this proposed universal arm of the tribe
test is applied to a specific tribe that operates payday lending entities.
III. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE ARM OF THE TRIBE TEST AND
PAYDAY LENDING
A. The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
1. The General Principles of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The Supreme Court of the United States has erroneously implied
that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity developed almost by
accident, resting on a single misinformed decision in the early twentieth
century. However, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is firmly
established law in American courts.41 Despite the Court’s limited
enthusiasm, tribal sovereign immunity is an inherent, retained sovereignty
that predates European contact, the founding of the United States, the
United States Constitution, and individual statehood. Accordingly, Indian
tribes are distinct, independent political communities, retaining their

41

Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756
(1998); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919); see, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991).
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original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time
immemorial.42
Although no longer possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty,
Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations entitled to all powers except
those they have been forced to surrender to a single superior sovereign,
the United States.43 Tribes are not states, nor part of the federal
government.44 Rather, tribes enjoy a status higher than that of states,
because tribes are sovereign political entities possessed of sovereign
authority not derived from the United States.45 Consequently, tribal
immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the
states.46
The Court has taken the lead in drawing the bounds of tribal
immunity, beginning in the late twentieth century, following a surge in tribal
economic development. However, Congress, subject to constitutional
limits, can alter the bounds of tribal immunity through explicit legislation.47
Under federal law, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity precludes suit
against a federally recognized Indian tribe except in instances where
Congress has abrogated that immunity or the tribe has foregone it.48
Accordingly, congressional abrogation or tribal waiver of sovereign
immunity cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed.49 The
relevant inquiry with respect to a tribe’s exercise of its sovereignty is
whether Congress, which exercises plenary power over Indian affairs,50
42

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. at
509 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831)); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978).
44
National Labor Relations Board v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1192 (10th
Cir.2002).
45
Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134
(10th Cir.1959) (Tribes are subordinate and dependent nations possessed of all powers
as such, only to the extent that they have expressly been required to surrender them by
the United States, and the United States Constitution is binding upon Indian nations only
where it expressly binds them or is made binding by Treaty or by some act of Congress).
46
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. at 756; see,
e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. World Engineering, 476 U.S.
877, 891 (1986).
47
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. at 759; see,
e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58.
48
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. at 754.
49
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58.
50
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
43
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has limited that sovereignty in any way.51 With regard to tribal sovereign
immunity, Congress has elected to not obstruct the doctrine in an effort to
encourage tribal economic development and self-sufficiency.
2. Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Enterprises
Tribal sovereign immunity applies without distinction between onreservation or off-reservation activities, and between governmental or
commercial activities.52 Despite criticism that in some instances offreservation tribal commercial businesses have become disconnected from
tribal self-governance, Congress has elected to not abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity with respect to these revenue generating business
activities. Following the lead of Congress, the Court has upheld the
application of tribal sovereign immunity to tribal businesses regardless of
location or industry.53
Tribal sovereign immunity protects subordinate secular or
commercial entities acting as arms of a tribe from state regulation and
legal action.54 Tribal sovereign immunity may extend to the subdivisions of
a tribe, including those engaged in economic activities, provided that the
relationship between the tribe and the entity is sufficiently close to properly
permit the entity to share in the tribe’s immunity.55 In order to determine
which tribal entities can share in a tribe’s immunity, courts implement what
is commonly referred to as the “arm of the tribe” test.

51

See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852-53
(1985).
52
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. at 754-55.
53
Id., at 757.
54
Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 920-21 (6th
Cir.2009); Native American Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288,
1292 (10th Cir.2008); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir.2006);
Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir.2000); Ninigret
Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st
Cir.2000).
55
See Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth , 207 F.3d at
29 (stating that tribal housing authority “as an arm of the Tribe, enjoys the full extent of
the Tribe’s sovereign immunity”); Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 978
(9th Cir.2002) (recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity “extends to agencies and
subdivisions of the tribe”).
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B. The Sovereign Immunity of Tribal Entities: The Arm of the
Tribe Test
Although the Court has not directly addressed the issue of which
specific tribal entities acting as arms of a tribe are entitled to immunity, the
Court has acknowledged that the United States has taken the position that
corporate entities may be arms of the tribe entitled to the protections of
tribal sovereign immunity.56 Recognizing that Congress has not imposed
any limitations on the application of tribal sovereign immunity to entities
acting as arms of a tribe, all of the federal courts of appeals acknowledge
that certain tribal corporate entities may enjoy the full extent of a tribe’s
sovereign immunity under specific circumstances.57
Consistent with federal Indian policy, the federal courts have
established general rules regarding the application of tribal sovereign
immunity derived from the reality of tribes’ need to generate revenue
through operating tribal businesses. As a threshold matter, an individual
member of a federally recognized tribe operating a business entity is not
entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.58 Furthermore, a tribal entity engaged
in business does not lose its immunity simply by contracting with nonIndian operators of the business.59 This is because, as a matter of
established federal Indian policy, Indian nations must be encouraged to
generate their own revenue to fund their governments and activities.
Therefore, tribes must be free to enter into commercial areas where they
do not have expertise but have the ability to acquire the necessary
expertise through non-Indian operators.60
56

See Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 705 n. 1 (2003) (noting
that the United States asserted, and the County did not dispute, that a corporation
operating a casino was an arm of the tribe for the purposes of sovereign immunity).
57
See, e.g., Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d at 92021; Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d at 1292; Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464
F.3d at 1046-47; Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1042-43; Ninigret
Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth , 207 F.3d at 29.
58
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game of State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 171-172 (1977);
Individual tribal members operating online payday loan companies have claimed tribal
sovereign immunity in various court proceedings. See PayDay Financial, LLC d/b/a
Lakota Cash; PayDay Financial, LLC, also d/b/a Western Sky Financial, LLC; and Great
Sky Finance, LLC.
59
See Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d at 1296 (Tribal tobacco company immune
despite fact that non-Indians operated company through a management agreement).
60
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (noting with
approval that the tribal business was “operated by non-Indian professional operators,
who receive a percentage of the profits”).
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In the absence of clarifying Court precedent, all of the federal
courts of appeals have developed standards for determining which tribally
affiliated entities are allowed immunity from regulation and legal suit.
Rather than depending on the nature of the business a tribe is conducting
through a particular entity, the question of whether tribal immunity is to be
extended to the entity depends on whether, in the language of the federal
courts, the entity is an “arm of the tribe.”61 According to all the federal
courts of appeals, the proper inquiry is whether the entity acts as an arm
of the tribe such that its activities are properly deemed to be those of the
tribe.62 Each of the federal courts of appeals applies a unique arm of the
tribe test, taking numerous and varied factors into consideration when
determining which entities are entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.
In general, the federal courts of appeals implement tests that
typically evaluate the creation of the entity, the benefits accorded to the
tribe by the entity, the amount of control the tribe exerts over the entity,
and whether the policies of tribal sovereign immunity would be served by
holding the entity as an arm of the tribe. In the application of the arm of the
tribe test, the federal courts vary in complexity and emphasis, often
assigning varying weights to a diverse range of factors. While all of the
federal courts apply slightly unique tests, the analyses of the First, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals are representative of the
diversity existent in federal Indian law, presented here from the least to
most exacting.
1. First Circuit
The First Circuit utilizes an arm of the tribe test contingent upon a
single factor. Specifically, the First Circuit analysis solely evaluates the
creation of the entity, requiring only that the entity be formed pursuant to
tribal law in order to enjoy immunity. In Ninigret Development Corp. v.
Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Housing Authority, the court held that a
tribal housing authority is entitled to the full extent of tribal sovereign
immunity.63

61

Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d at 920-921.
Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1046; see also Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton
Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1043; Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch
Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d at 29.
63
Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d at 21.
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Although the issue of tribal sovereign immunity received limited
discussion in the opinion, the Ninigret court cited the creation of the tribal
housing authority pursuant to a tribal ordinance as sufficient justification
for holding that the tribal housing authority is an arm of the tribe.64 A tribal
housing authority functions as an arm of the tribe, and thus is entitled to
exercise the defense of tribal sovereign immunity. The arm of the tribe test
implemented by the First Circuit illustrates the least strenuous test present
in the federal court system, hinging only on the method of creation of the
entity at issue.
2. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit employs a more exacting arm of the tribe test
than the First Circuit. The Eighth Circuit test assesses the creation,
funding, and control of the entity as well as the benefits accorded to the
tribe by the entity. In Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Community, the court
held that a tribal community college is an arm of the tribe, and thus entitled
to tribal sovereign immunity.65
The entity at issue in Hagen was a tribal community college. The
college was created pursuant to tribal law, and the college was chartered
as a nonprofit corporation under the tribal constitution.66 The Hagen court
found both of these facts to favor the extension of tribal sovereign
immunity to the college.67 After examining the creation of the college, the
court addressed the control and funding of the college.
The court also found that the college was sufficiently controlled and
funded68 by the tribe to grant the entity immunity from suit. First, the
college’s board of trustees is comprised of one enrolled member from
each of the tribe’s seven districts, which constituted appropriate tribal
control of the entity in the view of the court.69 Significantly, the college was
founded to provide direct benefit to tribal members on the reservation by
providing post-secondary education.70 In sum, the college is chartered,
funded, and adequately controlled by the tribe for the purposes of
64

Id. at 26-27.
Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1040.
66
Id. at 1042.
67
Id.
68
Id. (The court found that the tribe directly funded the College).
69
Id. at 1043.
70
Id.
65
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providing education to tribal members on Indian land. Therefore, the
Hagen court concluded, the college functioned as more than a mere
business, the college was an arm of the tribe entitled to sovereign
immunity.
Similar to the arm of the tribe tests used by the First and Eighth
Circuits, the Ninth Circuit analysis also examines the creation, funding,
and control of the entity by the tribe. However, the Ninth Circuit test is
more exacting than the First and Eighth Circuits as the Ninth Circuit
evaluates several additional factors.
3. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit implements an arm of the tribe test evaluating not
only the creation, control71 and funding of the entity, but also the benefits
accorded to the tribe by the entity and the policies of tribal sovereign
immunity. Specifically, in regard to the underlying policy considerations of
tribal sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit evaluates whether the policies
of tribal sovereign immunity are served by regarding the entity in question
to function as an arm of the tribe. In reaching a conclusion, the court
acknowledged that while a casino is no ordinary business, a tribal casino
is nevertheless entitled to tribal sovereign immunity because it properly
functions as an arm of the tribe.72
In Allen v. Gold Country Casino, the entity at issue was a tribal
casino.73 As justification for the holding, the court first relied on the
findings relating to the method and process by which the casino was
created. The formation of the casino was dependent upon tribal, state, and
federal approval at numerous levels because the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA) governs the process.74 Importantly, the Allen court
cited the passage of numerous tribal ordinances in order to create the
casino as support for the extension of tribal sovereign immunity.75 The
Allen court concluded that the casino was adequately created, owned, and

71

Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1047 (The court, relying on the stringent
requirements of IGRA, simply conceded that the casino is without question owned and
operated by the Tribe).
72
Id. at 1047-1049.
73
Id.
74
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (The IGRA requires a tribe to
authorize the creation of a tribal casino through both a tribal ordinance and an interstate
gaming compact with the respective state).
75
Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1047-1049.
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operated by the tribe to sustain a holding that the entity acted as an arm of
the tribe.
The Allen court additionally relied upon the benefits the casino
provides to the tribe and the congressional policies underlying a tribal
casino to support the holding that the casino is an arm of the tribe. To
begin with, the court determined that the benefit immunity would extend to
the tribe would protect the treasury of the tribe; this directly served one of
the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity.76 Moreover, IGRA provides for
the creation and operation of Indian casinos to promote “tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments,”77 all of
which are corresponding goals of tribal sovereign immunity. Specifically,
the compact enabling the creation of the casino provides that the casino
will “enable the tribe to develop self-sufficiency, promote tribal economic
development, and generate jobs and revenues to support the tribe’s
government, and governmental services and programs.”78 The court
determined that because the tribe owned and operated the casino, there is
no question these numerous economic and invaluable social advantages
ensure the benefit of the tribe itself.79
Under the Ninth Circuit arm of the tribe test, the creation of the
entity, the control exerted by the tribe over the entity, the benefits
accorded to the tribe by the entity, and the policies of tribal sovereign
immunity are examined. However, the arm of the tribe test implemented
by the Tenth Circuit dwarfs those of the Frist, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.
The Tenth Circuit illustrates the most complex arm of the tribe test,
incorporating six factors to aid in the sovereign immunity determination.
4. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit represents the most rigorous arm of the tribe test
present in Federal Indian Law today. The Tenth Circuit analysis submits
six factors for consideration, which range from the intention of the tribe in
creating the entity to the details of the financial relationships between the
76

Id. at 1048 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999)) (Noting that sovereign
immunity protects the financial integrity of States, many of which “could have been forced
into insolvency but for their immunity from private suits for money damages”).
77
25 U.S.C. § 2702 (One of the principle purposes of IGRA is “to ensure that the Indian
tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation).
78
Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1047-1048.
79
Id. at 1048.

403

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume I, Issue II – Spring 2013

parties involved.80 Specifically, in determining whether an entity is entitled
to tribal sovereign immunity, the Tenth Circuit gives weight to the following
factors: (1) the method of the entity’s creation; (2) the purpose of the
entity; (3) the structure, ownership, and management, including the
amount of control the tribe has over the entity; (4) whether the tribe
intended for the entity to have tribal sovereign immunity; (5) the financial
relationship between the tribe and the entity; and, (6) whether the
purposes of tribal sovereign immunity are served by granting the entity
immunity.81
In Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold
Casino and Resort, the entity at issue was a tribal Economic Development
Authority (the Authority), which owned and operated a casino in addition to
other enterprises.82 The governing body of tribes often creates an
economic development authority to manage tribal economic and social
enterprises. The court held that the Authority enjoys immunity from suit as
an arm of the tribe.83
The BMG court found the first factor, the method of creation of the
entity, and the fourth factor, whether the tribe intended for the entity to
enjoy immunity, to favor the extension of tribal sovereign immunity based
on tribal law and internal tribal corporate documents. Under the first factor,
the entity was created pursuant to tribal law.84 Additionally, the language
used by the tribe described the entity as a “wholly owned enterprise of the
tribe,” which the court noted to naturally suggest that the entity enjoys a
close relationship to the tribe.85 Pursuant to the fourth factor, evaluating
whether the tribe intended for the entity to enjoy sovereign immunity, the
court found that because numerous tribal ordinances and corporate
documents relating to the entity referenced sovereign immunity in a
manner that clearly expressed the tribe’s belief that the entities were
entitled to immunity from suit, this factor also favored extending tribal
sovereign immunity.
80

See Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort,
629 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir.2010) (The BMG court amended a prior ten factor arm of
the tribe test, and adopted a less exacting six factor test. The previous Tenth Circuit arm
of the tribe ten factor test can be found in Johnson v. Harrah’s Kansas Casino Corp.,
2006 WL 463138 (D.Kan. Feb. 23, 2006)).
81
Id. at 1182.
82
Id. at 1178.
83
Id. at 1173.
84
Id. at 1191.
85
Id.
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Likewise, the BMG court found the second factor and the fifth factor
to favor the extension of tribal sovereign immunity because the revenue
generated by the Authority is predominately allocated to the tribe itself.
Consistent with the second factor, the court found that the entity was
created for the financial benefit of the tribe, because the language of the
ordinances creating the entity showed intended economic benefit to the
tribe, and the profit sharing scheme delegated a majority of the revenue
back to the tribe or its members.86 Similarly, under the fifth factor, the court
found that the revenue scheme favored tribal immunity because about
85% of the profits are distributed directly to the tribal government.87
The BMG court found that while the board and executive level
employees were not entirely comprised of tribal members, a sufficient
number exercised control to find the third factor in favor of the Authority
and immunity. In accordance with the third factor, which focuses on the
amount of control the tribe has over the entity, the court found the
managerial structures of the Authority and its subsidiary to weigh both for
and against the tribe. While the Authority’s board of directors are all tribal
members and also hold seats on tribal council, the chief financial officer of
the Authority, the general manager of the casino, the chief financial officer
of the casino, and twelve of the fifteen directors of the casino are nontribal members.88 Lastly, under the sixth factor, the court found that the
purposes of tribal sovereign immunity would be served in this case
because immunity would protect the treasury of the tribe.89
5. A Universal Arm of the Tribe Test
While all of the federal courts of appeals apply slightly different
tests when determining which tribal entities are entitled to tribal sovereign
immunity, adequate consistency exists between the various tests to yield a
universal arm of the tribal test by which tribes can create and operate
revenue-generating enterprises. This proposed universal arm of the tribe
test incorporates several factors present in all of the arm of the tribe tests
used by the federal courts of appeals. Moreover, this proposed test
incorporates the underlying federal policies of tribal sovereign immunity
into the analysis. The factors incorporated into the universal arm of the
86

Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1194.
88
Id. at 1192-1193.
89
Id. at 1195.
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tribe test are: (a) the method of creation of the entity; (b) tribal control over
the entity; (c) benefits accorded to the tribe by the entity; and, (d) whether
the policies of tribal sovereign immunity are served by allowing the entity
the protections of tribal sovereign immunity. The following section will
evaluate criteria necessary to satisfy each factor as informed by previous
decisions issued by numerous circuit courts of appeals.
i. Creation of the Entity
The first factor examines the creation of the tribal entity. Under this
inquiry, the court should consider whether the entity was created pursuant
to tribal law, and whether the entity was dependent upon the tribal
government approval and involvement throughout its formation. If the
entity was created pursuant to tribal law, this significantly weighs in favor
of the application of tribal sovereign immunity to the entity.90
ii. Tribal Control over the Entity
The second factor examines the control the tribe exerts over the
entity. Here, the court should examine how much influence the tribe has
over the structure, ownership, and management of the entity. Additionally,
the court should take the membership of the board of directors and
executive officers of the entity into account, as well as their method of
appointment. If the board of directors or trustees of the entity are members
of the tribe, this weighs in favor of extending tribal sovereign immunity to
the entity.91 Similarly, if the chief executive officers of the entity are tribal
members or are appointed by the tribe, this also favors immunity.92
iii. Benefits the Tribe Receives from the Entity
The third factor examines the economic and social benefits the
entity conveys to the tribe. When determining the benefits accorded to the
tribe, the court should evaluate the financial contributions made to the

90

See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1043; Allen v. Gold
Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1046; Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi
Gold Casino and Resort, 629 F.3d at 1191-1192;
91
See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1040; Breakthrough
Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629 F.3d at 1194.
92
See, e.g., Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and
Resort, 629 F.3d at 1194.
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tribe by the entity. Likewise, the court should examine how the revenue is
allocated.
With regard to the non-financial benefits conferred on the tribe, the
inquiry focuses on whether the entity will further enable the tribe to
develop self-sufficiency, promote tribal economic development, and
generate jobs and revenue to support the tribe’s government and
governmental services and programs.93
iv. Policy Purposes of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The fourth factor examines the policies underlying the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity, its connection to tribal economic development,
and whether those policies are served by granting immunity to the tribal
business entity in question.94 Specifically, the court should consider
whether extending immunity to the entity “directly protects the sovereign
tribe’s treasury, which is one of the historic purposes of sovereign
immunity in general.”95
C. Are Tribal Payday Lenders Entitled to Immunity Under the
Arm of the Tribe Test? An Examination of the Payday Lending
Operations of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma
The decisions of the federal courts of appeals regarding tribal
sovereign immunity and the corresponding arm of the tribe test, when
evaluated together, reasonably inform a universal arm of the tribe test.
This universal arm of the tribe test incorporates four factors. These factors
evaluate the creation of the entity, the control the tribe has over the entity,
the benefits accorded to the tribe by the entity, and determine whether the
policies of tribal sovereign immunity would be served by deeming a
particular entity in question an arm of the tribe.
To illustrate the application of these factors to tribal payday lending
enterprises, the payday lending entities of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma
93

See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1046-1047.
See Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1111 (Ariz.1989) (“Tribal sovereign
immunity should only apply when doing so furthers the federal policies behind the
immunity doctrine”); Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 294 (Minn.1996) (Courts
should determine “whether federal policies intended to promote Indian tribal autonomy
are furthered by the extension of immunity to the business entity”).
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Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629
F.3d at 1195; Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1047.
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(the Tribe) are evaluated. Given the specifics of the Tribe’s payday lending
operations and the corresponding analysis in the context of the universal
arm of the tribe test, this paper concludes that these kinds of tribal payday
lending operations do function as arms of the tribe under the law, and are
therefore entitled to the protections of tribal sovereign immunity.
The Tribe operates numerous payday lending businesses in a
manner consistent with the federal courts of appeals’ application of tribal
sovereign immunity to entities acting as arms of the tribe. The Miami Tribe
of Oklahoma created the payday lending entities pursuant to tribal law,
and the tribal government sufficiently controls the actions of the entities.
Furthermore, the operation of the payday lending entities has conferred
great benefits on the Tribe as a whole, and extension of immunity to the
entities would honor the policies underlying tribal sovereign immunity.
The Tribe is a federally recognized tribe comprised of over 3,800
enrolled citizens.96 The Tribe is associated with the online payday loan
providers USFastCash®, AmeriLoan®, and UnitedCashLoans®.97 The
Tribe operates the tribal economic development authority Miami Nation
Enterprises, Inc. (MNE), which in turn owns and operates the online
payday loan providers in question.98
Currently, MNE operates as a political economic subdivision of the
Tribe created by the Tribe to pursue economic development opportunities
for the good of the Miami Nation and its citizens.99 MNE oversees tribally
owned companies such as Miami Business Services, Miami Cineplex, and
ServiceWorld Computer in addition to several payday lending
operations.100 Similar to the tribal Economic Development Authority in
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Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, http://www.miamination.com/mto/about.html (last visited Apr.
20, 2013).
97
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma and MNE Services, Inc., www.usfastcash.com,
,
www.ameriloan.com, unitedcashloans.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
98
The disclaimer on the websites affiliated with the Miami Tribe claim to be operated by
MNE and owned by the Tribe (“MNE, Inc., doing business as
USFastCash®/AmeriLoan®/ UnitedCashLoans®, is a tribal lending entity wholly owned
and operated by the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, a Sovereign Nation recognized by the
United States government under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936”). See supra
note 66.
99
Miami Nation Enterprises Inc. http://www.mn-e.com/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
100
Miami Nation Enterprises Inc., http://www.mn-e.com/companies (last visited Apr. 20,
2013).
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Allen, 101 MNE is the Tribe’s economic development authority and likewise
enjoys immunity from suit as an arm of the tribe.102
1. Was the Payday Lending Entity Created Pursuant to
Tribal Law?
MNE and the payday lending subsidiaries were created pursuant to
a tribal constitution and through the enactment of specific tribal
ordinances, favoring application of tribal sovereign immunity to the
entities. To begin with, the constitution of the Tribe creates a Business
Committee, which is expressly authorized to enact resolutions and
ordinances “to transact business and otherwise speak or act on behalf of
the tribe in all matters on which the Tribe is empowered to act.”103 Citing a
“critical need for the development of economic activities to provide for the
well-being of the citizens of the Miami Tribe,” the Business Committee
established MNE pursuant to the tribal constitution as “a subordinate
economic enterprise of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma having the purposes,
powers, and duties as herein or hereafter provided by tribal law.”104
The tribal resolution and ordinances establishing MNE specifically
authorized MNE to engage in “providing sources of revenue through direct
tribal business activities.”105 Consistent with established tribal law, the
Tribe enacted a tribal ordinance to permit MNE to engage in the payday
lending business.106 Specifically, the ordinance authorized the Tribe to
issue payday loan licenses to MNE.107
2. How Much Control Does the Tribe Have in the Operation
of the Payday Lending Business?
The Tribe owns, operates, and sufficiently controls both MNE and
the payday lending entities. The relationship between the Tribal Council,
the Business Committee, MNE, and the payday lending entities is
sufficiently close to properly permit the entity to share in the tribe’s
immunity.
101

Breakthrough Management Group, Inc., v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629
F.3d 1173 (10th Cir.2010).
102
Id.
103
MIAMI CONST., art. VI § 1.
104
Amended Miami Nation Enterprises Act, §§ 202(a), 101(a).
105
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma Business Enterprises Act § 102(a).
106
Miami Tribal Council Res. 04-62 (2002).
107
Id.
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MNE’s board of directors consists of three members, two of whom
must be members of the Tribe.108 Members of the board of directors are
appointed by the Chief of the Tribe, with the advice and consent of the
tribal Business Committee.109 The tribal Business Committee appoints the
executive officers of MNE, including the chief operating officer. The CEO
of MNE is responsible for the day-to-day operations of MNE, but is
accountable to and directed in policy matters by the MNE board of
directors. In turn, the MNE board of directors is ultimately answerable to
the tribal council.
The tribal ordinance permitting MNE to engage in the payday
lending business also imposes substantive and regulatory requirements
on MNE’s payday loan business, charging the Tribe’s Business
Committee with ensuring MNE’s compliance with the requirements of the
ordinance.110
3. How Do the Payday Lending Entities Benefit the Tribe?
The operation of the Tribe’s payday lending enterprises through
MNE confers substantial benefits on the Tribe itself, which favors the
conclusion that the entities are in fact arms of the tribe. The revenues from
the payday lending operations have been used, among other things, to
build a new headquarters for MNE. This is a significant benefit to the Tribe
because MNE provides a considerable portion of its revenues to the
Tribe’s general fund, which enables the operation of the tribal government.
Moreover, MNE’s payday lending operations also employ many tribal
members on the reservations, where MNE headquarters are located. The
revenues from the payday lending enterprises have also been used to
fund various tribal programs, including a scholarship program for postsecondary education.
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Amended Miami Nations Enterprise Act § 202(a); Miami Tribal Council Res. 05-14
(2005).
109
Miami Tribal Council Res. 05-14 (2005).
110
Miami Tribal Council Res. 04-62 (2002).
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4. Is Immunity Consistent with the Policies of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity?
Extending tribal sovereign immunity to MNE’s payday lending
subsidiaries would adhere to the policies of tribal sovereign immunity.
First, MNE operates the payday lending subsidiaries and the Tribe itself
exercises considerable control over MNE’s actions as previously
discussed. Furthermore, extending the Tribe’s immunity to MNE and the
payday lending operations is consistent with the policies of tribal sovereign
immunity for no other reason than that the tribes have been economically
and socially benefitted by the payday loan activities.
CONCLUSION
Payday lending itself may be predatory in nature and fall short of a
reputable business operation, but in light of difficult economic
circumstances, this business model may be a welcomed temporary
solution to some tribes’ financial challenges. While payday lending is in
some respects analogous to the operation of gaming enterprises under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, it is by no means an appropriate
permanent solution to solve the issue of tribal financial needs. More
importantly, if the operation of tribal payday lending enterprises is within
the law and policy of tribal sovereign immunity, tribes should be able to
profit from this industry. Despite criticism of payday lending, tribes have
the right to choose which industries they decide to profit from.
The Court has not yet taken a case addressing the specific kind of
business entities, such as payday lending operations, entitled to tribal
sovereign immunity. If the current Court is confronted with a case involving
a tribally affiliated payday lender, likely deference will not be given to the
objective and reasonable tests adopted by the federal courts of appeals.
Instead, it is widely anticipated that if the Court were to take up a case
involving tribal payday lenders who implement questionable business
models and unethical practices, this set of facts would likely result in a
harsh curtailment of tribal sovereign immunity. Reigning in sovereign
immunity would undoubtedly have a detrimental economic and social
impact on Indian Country.
Payday lending must be conducted ethically with regard to the
treatment of consumers and recognition must be given to the regulatory
frameworks governing the industry outside of Indian Country. Moreover,
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tribes should not conduct payday lending over an extended period of time,
and if a tribe elects to engage in this business, the tribe should attempt to
fly under the radar of the press, federal officials, and the courts. Most
importantly, tribally owned and operated payday lenders must act in a
manner consistent with the principles of tribal sovereign immunity.
Otherwise, a few misinformed tribal nations may abrogate the right to
sovereign immunity for all of Indian Country.
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